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PHYSICALITY IN AUSTRALIAN PATENT 
LAW 
BEN MCENIERY* 
It is generally understood that the patent system exists to encourage the 
conception and disclosure of new and useful inventions embodied in 
machines and other physical devices, along with new methods that 
physically transform matter from one state to another. What is not well 
understood is whether, and to what extent, the patent system is to encourage 
and protect the conception and disclosure of inventions that are non-
physical methods – namely those that do not result in a physical 
transformation of matter. This issue was considered in Grant v 
Commissioner of Patents. In that case the Full Court of the Federal Court 
of Australia held that an invention must involve a physical effect or 
transformation to be patentable subject matter. In doing so, it introduced a 
physicality requirement into Australian law. What this article seeks to 
establish is whether the court’s decision is consistent with the case law on 
point. It does so by examining the key common law cases that followed the 
High Court’s watershed decision in National Research Development 
Corporation v Commissioner of Patents, the undisputed authoritative 
statement of principle in regard to the patentable subject matter standard in 
Australia. This is done with a view to determining whether there is anything 
in those cases that supports the view that the Australian patentable subject 
matter test contains a physicality requirement. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Conventional thinking in Australia and other places has been that patents are 
the domain of engineering, applied science and industrial manufacturing. As a 
consequence, it is commonly thought that patent law’s influence extends only 
as far as the protection of inventions embodied in new and useful machines 
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and other physical devices, and new methods that physically transform matter 
from one state into another. This traditional conception of the role of the 
patent system is something that is arguably inherited from mid-nineteenth 
century British law,1 and is a corollary of a belief that technology is 
something necessarily tied to machines, physical devices and substances, and 
physically-transformative methods.2 Although these traditional expectations 
still exist in the 21st century, it is doubtful that the law is actually constrained 
in this way. Tying patent eligibility to the physical binds the patent system to 
industrial technologies and leaves it unable to respond flexibly to new 
technologies as they arise.3  
While it is clear that the presence of a machine or other physical artefact or a 
physically transformative method is a strong indicator of patentable subject 
matter, what is not clear is why non-physical methods, being those that do not 
involve a machine or other physical device and those that do not involve a 
physical transformation of matter, ought to be denied patent eligibility. In 
other words, it is yet to be adequately resolved whether Australian patent law 
contains a physicality requirement.  
Addressing the issue of whether patent law contains a physicality requirement 
demands an understanding of the nature of the patent law bargain. That 
bargain is that exclusive rights to exploit an invention are granted only in 
exchange for a full public disclosure of the invention and its workings. Thus, 
the nature of the patent law bargain involves a careful balancing of the 
public’s right to make use of, and make improvements to, new information 
                                                 
1 The King v Wheeler (1819) 2 B & Ald 345, 349; 106 ER 392, 394–95; Bristol-Myers Co v 
Beecham Group Ltd [1974] AC 646, 677–8, in which Lord Diplock observed of the ‘archaic 
language’ of the Statute of Monopolies that it: ‘would appear to contemplate as the principal 
subject of monopolies new artefacts which had not been made before in England, and in some 
of the very earliest authorities this view appears to have found favour with the courts; but it 
did not survive and it has been long established that under the Statute of Monopolies patents 
could also be granted for new processes for making artefacts which were not themselves 
new’. See also Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2001) 310 (‘the image of the invention as the human intervention into nature 
that brings about a resulting physical change that underpins much contemporary 
jurisprudence, was well entrenched in British law by the mid-nineteenth century.’). 
2 Ben McEniery, ‘The Patentability of Non-Physical Inventions: Lessons from the United 
States’ (2009) 35(2) Monash University Law Review 376, 377–8. 
3 For authority as to proposition that there is a need for the patent system to respond flexibility 
to accommodate to new technologies as they arise, see National Research Development 
Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252 and American Cyanamid 
Company (Dann’s) Patent (Dann’s Patent) [1971] RPC 425, 451–2 (Lord Diplock). 
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and ideas, and the private right to protection from free riders.4 The question to 
ask in this regard is whether allowing patents to be granted for non-physical 
inventions violates fundamental notions as to what a patent is and what ends 
patent law is supposed to achieve.  
II THE GRANT DECISION – FINDING A PHYSICALITY 
REQUIREMENT  
This question was considered by the Full Federal Court in Grant v 
Commissioner of Patents5 (‘Grant’). There, the Court held that, to be 
patentable subject matter, an invention must result in the production or 
alteration of a physical object or produce a physically observable effect.6  
The patent application considered in Grant was without doubt an 
unconventional use of the patent system. It sought to reserve to one individual 
the right to apply certain aspects of the law in a particular way to achieve a 
useful result. It was just one of many attempts by innovators in professional 
services firms to seek the same rewards and advantages offered by the patent 
system that have traditionally been awarded to engineers and industrialists. 
The claimed invention in Grant was a business method aimed at protecting an 
asset from the claims of creditors. However, Mr Grant’s claimed invention 
was not merely a business method, but was a business method devoid of any 
physical constraints. The claims list the steps of: creating a trust; a person 
making a gift of money to the trust; the trustee lending a sum of money to the 
person, and, finally, the trustee securing the loan by taking a charge over the 
asset. The purpose of the method is to establish a charge over the asset in 
favour of the trustee that takes priority over other the claims of other 
creditors.7 
                                                 
4 Suzanne Scotchmer, ‘Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the 
Patent Law’ (1991) 5(1) Journal of Economic Perspectives 29, 29–34; Mark A Lemley, ‘The 
Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law’ (1997) 75 Texas Law Review 989, 
997; Robert P Merges and Richard R Nelson, ‘On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope’ 
(1990) 90 Columbia Law Review 839. See also Alvin Edward Moore, ‘Edison and the 
Phonograph’ (1932) 14 Journal of the Patent Office Society 39, 39. 
5 [2006] FCAFC 120 (Heerey, Kiefel and Bennett JJ). 
6 Grant [2006] FCAFC 120, [30], [32], [47]. For a concise summary of the Full Court’s 
decision, see Brian Fitzgerald et al, Internet and E-commerce Law: Business and Policy 
(Thomson Reuters, 2011) 504–6. 
7 Australian Innovation Patent No 2003100074 (‘Asset Protection Method’) (filed February 7, 
2003). 
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On appeal, the Full Court ruled the patent invalid, upholding the decisions of 
the Deputy Commissioner of Patents,8 and a single judge of the Federal 
Court.9 In doing so, the Full Court concluded that any method that does not 
produce a physical result is merely ‘intellectual information’, which has never 
been patentable.10 The Court did not hold the patent invalid because it 
describes a business method. Although the Court accepted that business 
methods are not excluded from patent eligibility as a category subject matter, 
it found that a business method removed from any physical apparatus or other 
physical embodiment is not patentable subject matter.11  
In its reasons, the Full Court asked whether the alleged invention before it was 
a proper subject of letters patent according to the principles which have 
developed over time to guide the application of section 6 of the Statute of 
Monopolies. The Court examined a number of cases and observed that the 
patentability of an invention that does not produce a physical effect or cause a 
physical transformation of matter has never been upheld.12 From this 
observation, the court inferred that non-physical methods are categorically 
excluded from patent eligibility.13  
                                                 
8 Stephen John Grant (2004) 62 IPR 143. 
9 The matter was originally heard before a single judge of the Federal Court of Australia: Grant 
v Commissioner of Patents [2005] FCA 1100 (Branson J). 
10 Grant [2006] FCAFC 120 [14]–[23]. 
11 Ibid [47]. 
12 The Court considered: Burroughs Corporation (Perkins’) Application [1974] RPC 147; 
Commissioner of Patents v Lee (1913) 16 CLR 138; Commissioner of Patents v Microcell Ltd 
(1959) 102 CLR 232; International Business Machines Corporation’s Application [1980] 
FSR 564; International Business Machines Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1991) 33 
FCR 218; Neilson v Minister of Public Works (NSW) (1914) 18 CLR 423; Re Brown (1899) 5 
ALR 81; Re Cooper’s Application for a Patent (1901) 19 RPC 53; Re ESP’s Application 
(1944) 62 RPC 87; Re Fishburn’s Application (1938) 57 RPC 245; Re GEC’s Application 
(1942) 60 RPC 1; Re Johnson’s Application for a Patent (1901) 19 RPC 56; Re Lenard’s 
Application (1954) 71 RPC 190; Re W’s Application (1914) 31 RPC 141; Rogers v 
Commissioner of Patents (1910) 10 CLR 701. The Court noted that in NRDC, an artificial 
effect was physically created on the land, and that in each of Welcome Real-Time SA v Catuity 
Inc, CCOM v Jiejing and in the United States decisions of State Street Bank & Trust Co v 
Signature Financial Group and AT&T Corp v Excel Communications, Inc, there was a 
component physically affected or a change in state or information in a part of a device or 
machine. 
13 Ben McEniery, ‘Patents for Intangible Inventions in Australia after Grant v Commissioner of 
Patents (Part 2)’ (2007) 13(3) Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 100, 102. 
[Student editor note: Could we please check with the author whether he wanted to cite 
the article I have cited, the case or other source? Please note – if the footnote as I have 
cited it is incorrect, this will impact on footnote 15 also.] 
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The Grant decision has been criticised in the academic literature on the 
grounds that it is fundamentally inconsistent with the principles set out in the 
High Court’s landmark decision in National Research Development 
Corporation v Commissioner of Patents14 (‘NRDC’). It has been argued that 
in NRDC, the High Court explained that the patentable subject matter inquiry 
is a broad test that recognises all new and useful innovation as patent eligible, 
irrespective of whether it involves a physical embodiment or a transformation 
of physical matter.15  
That Grant is inconsistent with the principles set out in NRDC is confirmed, 
albeit by way of obiter, in the High Court’s 2002 decision in Grain Pool of 
WA v Commonwealth.16 There the Court said: 
At the time of the enactment of the Constitution, there was still awaiting for 
final decision the question whether it was enough that a process produced a 
useful result or whether it was necessary that some physical thing either be 
brought into existence or be so affected such as better to serve the purposes 
of mankind. The point was not settled until the celebrated judgment of 
Dixon CJ, Kitto and Windeyer JJ in National Research Development 
Corporation v Commissioner of Patents. Their Honours held that the 
requirement of a ‘vendible product’ for a valid process claim meant no more 
than that the end produced be of utility in practical affairs.17 
While the academic literature on point is valuable, it does not systematically 
address whether the Federal Court’s finding in Grant is consistent with the 
decisions in the important cases that followed and interpreted the High 
Court’s statements of principle in NRDC. This article aims to fill that gap by 
examining whether there is anything in that case law which supports the 
finding in Grant that Australian patent law contains a physicality requirement, 
or supports a patent eligibility standard free of physical constraints.  
                                                 
14 (1959) 102 CLR 252.  
15 Ben McEniery, ‘Patents for Intangible Inventions in Australia after Grant v Commissioner of 
Patents (Part 1)’ (2007) 13(2) Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 70; McEniery, 
‘Patents for Intangible Inventions in Australia (Part 2)’, above n 13.. See also: Ann L Monotti, 
‘The Scope of ‘Manner of Manufacture’ Under the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) after Grant v 
Commissioner of Patents’ (2006) 34(3) Federal Law Review 461; McEniery, ‘The 
Patentability of Non-Physical Inventions: Lessons From the United States’, above n 2; 
Charles Lawson, ‘Grant v Commissioner of Patents and Patenting Knowledge Inventions’ 
(2008) 15 Journal of Law and Medicine 626.  
16 (2000) 202 CLR 479. 
17 Ibid 502. 
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An analysis of the post-NRDC, pre-Grant case law is desirable because those 
cases contain the most recent judicial analysis of the patent eligibility standard 
that Australian law has to draw from when assessing the patentability of new 
technologies. Assessing these cases is necessary because they are cases in 
which non-industrial subject matter, such as computer software and business 
methods, is considered in light of the approach to subject matter eligibility 
prescribed by the Statute of Monopolies. Included in this discussion is a 
selection of the pre-1977 United Kingdom cases, which are considered to be 
of persuasive influence in Australia.18 What is sought from this analysis is 
language in the jurisprudence to indicate whether judges over time have been 
open to the possibility that patent eligible subject matter might exist in an 
invention where the inventive concept is free of any physical embodiment. 
III PHYSICALITY AND PATENT LAW THEORY 
The theoretical underpinning or justification for the patent system is that it 
exists to encourage innovation by providing incentives to invent and invest in 
innovation and to disclose the workings of new technologies to the public. 
Possibly the best enunciation of the purpose of patent law, and one that is 
consistent with the aims of the patent system worldwide, comes from the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Aronson v Quick Point Pencil 
Co:19 
First, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it promotes 
disclosure of inventions to stimulate further innovation and to permit the 
public to practice the invention once the patent expires; third, the stringent 
requirements for patent protection seek to assure that ideas in the public 
domain remain there for the free use of the public.20 
It is the potential economic rewards to be reaped during the patent term that 
induce the time, effort, expenditure and other resources needed for innovation 
to occur. This can be seen in the patent custom of the Venetian Republic,21 
                                                 
18 The reason for tracing United Kingdom law only to 1977 is that 1977 is the year the United 
Kingdom abandoned its Statute of Monopolies-based regime for a new patent system 
modelled on the Convention on the Grant of European Patents, opened for signature 5 
October 1973, 13 ILM 268 (entered into force 7 October 1977) (‘European Patent 
Convention’). See Patents Act 1977 (UK) c 37. 
19 440 US 257 (1979). 
20 Ibid 262. 
21 Giulio Mandich, ‘Venetian Patents (1450-1550)’ (1948) 30 Journal of the Patent Office 
Society 166 (F D Prager trans); Giulio Mandich, ‘Venetian Origins of Inventor’s Rights’ 
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and the earliest English custom of granting monopolies.22 The rationale is 
equally evident in today’s modern patent system23 and is regarded as the 
justification for the existence of patent law in Australia today.24 Thus, patent 
law does not recognise the existence of natural rights that vest automatically 
in an inventor, but provides an economic incentive to encourage inventors to 
create inventions for the benefit of the public.25  
Innovation, the creation and application of new ideas, is a key factor in 
achieving economic growth and prosperity.26 Innovation is considered to be 
an essential ingredient for economic growth and is a key factor that 
contributes to prosperity and raises standards of living.27 Prosperity, or 
                                                                                                                    
(1960) 42 Journal of the Patent Office Society 378 (F D Prager trans); Edward C 
Walterscheid, ‘The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 1)’ 
(1994) 76 Journal of the Patent & Trademark Office Society 697, 709-710; Frank D Prager, 
‘A History of Intellectual Property from 1545 to 1787’ (1944) 26(11) Journal of the Patent 
Office Society 711, 715, 750. 
22 Edward Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England (1628–1644) vol 3, 184 (‘The reason 
wherefore such a privilege is good in law is because the inventor bringeth to and for the 
common wealth a new manufacture by his invention, costs and charges, and therefore it is 
reason, that he should have a privilege for his reward (and the encouragement of others in the 
like) for a convenient time.’); Statute of Monopolies 21 Jam 1, Ch 3 (1623) (Eng). 
23 Fritz Machlup, ‘An Economic Review of the Patent System’ (Study No 15, Subcommittee on 
Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights, Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong, 2d Sess, 1958) 
36-8; Roberto Mazzoleni and Richard R Nelson, ‘The Benefits and Costs of Strong Patent 
Protection: A Contribution to the Current Debate’ (1998) 27(3) Research Policy 273; Lionel 
Bently and Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2001) 
315. 
24 CCOM v Jiejing (1994) 122 ALR 417, 433; Advanced Building Systems Pty Ltd v Ramset 
Fasteners (Aust) Pty Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 171, 195 (Kirby J); Welcome Real-Time SA v 
Catuity Inc [2001] FCA 445, [129] (Heerey J) (‘the law has to strike a balance between, on 
the one hand, the encouragement of true innovation by the grant of monopoly and, on the 
other, freedom of competition.’); Ronald Sackville, ‘Monopoly Versus Freedom of Ideas: The 
Expansion of Intellectual Property’ (2005) 16 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 65, 65-
66. This is the case despite the Patents Act containing no statement as to its purpose. In this 
regard, Australia is not alone in failing to include any clear statement of objectives in its 
patent statute. 
25 Machlup, above n 23, 29–30; Paul E Schaafsma, ‘An Economic Overview of Patents’ (1997) 
79 Journal of the Patent & Trademark Office Society 241, 243.  
26 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘The Knowledge-Based 
Economy’ (Report, 1996) 3; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘A 
New Economy? The Changing Role of Innovation and Information Technology in Growth’ 
(Study, 2000); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘The New 
Economy: Beyond the Hype’ (Final Report on the OECD Growth Project, 2001).  
27 United States Federal Trade Commission, ‘To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of 
Competition and Patent Law and Policy’ (Report, 28 October 2003) 1, citing Federal Reserve 
Board Vice Chairman Roger W Ferguson Jr, ‘Patent Policy in a Broader Context’ (Speech 
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success in material terms, is achieved through maximising innovative output 
and the creation of new technologies.28 
Creating useful ideas takes time, effort, expenditure and other resources. 
While the costs of producing the information that describes an invention may 
be high, once conceived, that information is capable of being copied at 
negligible cost without re-incurring the initial costs of its conception. Patent 
protection allows the patentee to charge an uncompetitive price in an absence 
of competition in order to appropriate a larger share of the social benefits of 
an invention than he or she might otherwise receive. In the absence of a patent 
monopoly, free riders who imitate and reverse engineer can lawfully earn 
profits by selling competing products without having to recoup the sunken 
costs of creating the invention. In doing so, they profit from the inventor’s 
ingenuity and diminish his or her market share. Without the patent system, too 
few new ideas would be created and new inventions would be under produced 
or not produced at all.29  
Since innovation is nothing more than the creation of new knowledge and 
ideas and is not contingent on the creation of new machines, physical devices 
and transformative methods, from a theoretical perspective it makes little 
sense to limit the scope of patentable subject matter to new technologies that 
are bound by physical constraints. 
                                                                                                                    
delivered at the 2003 Financial Markets Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 
Sea Island, Georgia, 5 April 2003): ‘innovation benefits consumers through the development 
of new and improved goods, services, and processes. An economy’s capacity for invention 
and innovation helps drive its economic growth and the degree to which standards of living 
increase.’ 
28 Fritz Machlup, The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States 
(Princeton University Press, 1962); Carl Shapiro and Hal R Varian, Information Rules: A 
Strategic Guide to the Network Economy (Harvard Business Press, 1999). In fact, economists 
trace 30 to 40 per cent of all gains in productivity and growth in the United States over the 
course of the 20th century to economic innovation in its various forms: Robert J Shapiro and 
Nam D Pham, ‘Economic Effects of Intellectual Property- Intensive Manufacturing in the 
United States (Study, July 2007).  [Student editor noted: Link removed because it is broken. It 
is available here however, should the author wish to include it: 
http://www.sonecon.com/docs] 
29 Robert P Merges, Peter S Menell and Mark A Lemley, Intellectual Property in the New 
Technological Age (Aspen Law and Business, 3rd ed, 2003), 10–18; Peter S Menell, ‘An 
Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs’ (1989) 41 Stanford 
Law Review 1045, 1059–1066; Mark A Lemley, ‘Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for 
Intellectual Property’ (2004) 71 University of Chicago Law Review 129, 129. 
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IV THE PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER TEST 
There are two types of patents in Australia: standard patents and innovation 
patents. Standard patents confer monopoly protection for inventions for a 
maximum term of 20 years.30 Innovation patents, which require a significantly 
lesser degree of inventiveness, are awarded for a maximum term of 8 years.31 
This limited period of monopoly protection is given to the inventor, or his or 
her assignee, in exchange for revealing to the public the workings of the 
technology described in the invention. 
The statutory basis of the Australian patentable subject matter test lies in 
section 18(1) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth). That provision states that an 
invention, to be a patentable invention, must lie within the bounds of 
patentable subject matter (the ‘manner of manufacture’ test), be novel, involve 
an inventive step, be practically useful, and not have been used in secret so as 
to extend the period of monopoly protection beyond that provided by the 
statute.  
Section 18(1) provides that ‘an invention is a patentable invention’, where a 
standard patent is concerned,: 
if the invention, so far as claimed in any claim: 
(a) is a manner of manufacture within the meaning of section 6 of the 
Statute of Monopolies; and 
(b) when compared with the prior art base as it existed before the priority 
date of that claim: 
(i) is novel; and 
(ii) involves an inventive step; and 
(c) is useful; and 
(d) was not secretly used in the patent area before the priority date of that 
claim by, or on behalf of, or with the authority of, the patentee or nominated 
person or the patentee's or nominated person's predecessor in title to the 
invention. 
                                                 
30 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 67. 
31 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 68. The innovation patent is a second-tier patent introduced into 
Australian law by the Patents Amendment (Innovation Patents) Act 2000 (Cth). 
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The test for an innovation patent is similar, the main difference being that an 
innovative step, rather than an inventive step, is required.32 
The focus of this article is the ‘manner of manufacture’ requirement, which 
determines the scope of patentable subject matter. The ‘manner of 
manufacture’ requirement stems from section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies,33 
a 400-year-old English statute that is the basis of modern patent law and 
practice.34  
The object of the Statute of Monopolies was the curtailment of the Crown 
practice of granting monopolies to court favourites in goods or businesses 
which had long before been enjoyed by the public, a practice considered to be 
contrary to the common law.35 While the objective of the Statute of 
Monopolies was to declare grants of monopolies void,36 it recognised 
nonetheless that monopolies which pertained to inventions and were limited in 
duration might serve the public interest by providing an incentive to invent 
and to bring new technologies to the realm.  
                                                 
32 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 18(1A). Section 18(3) and (4) further provides that certain 
inventions not patentable inventions for the purposes of an innovation patent. These include 
‘patent, plants and animals, and the biological processes for the generation of plants and 
animals’ unless ‘the invention is a microbiological process or a product of such a process’. 
33 21 Jam 1, ch 3 (1623) (Eng). The Statute of Monopolies is the short title of the Act. The long 
title is ‘An Act Concerning Monopolies and Dispensations with Penal Laws and the Forfeiture 
Thereof’. 
34 Ramon A Klitzke, ‘Historical Background of the English Patent Law’ (1959) 41 Journal of 
the Patent Office Society 615, 615 (‘The basic truths found by the English 400 years ago are 
still valid today and should continue to influence us in the interpretation and application of 
our law, even though it has become greatly refined and perfected.’). 
35 Jacob I Corré, ‘The Argument, Decision and Reports of Darcy v. Allen’ (1996) 45 Emory 
Law Journal 1261, 1261. The fame of Darcy v Allen is largely due to the reports of Sir 
Edward Coke: (1603) 11 Coke Rep 84b, 77 Eng Rep 1260. Coke appeared as 
AttorneyGeneral before the Kings Bench in Darcy v Allen, was one of the reporters of the 
case and was involved in drafting of the Statute of Monopolies. Two other reports exist: 
(1603) 72 Eng Rep 830 (Moore 671); (1603) Noy 173, 74 Eng Rep 1131. The case has also 
been referred to as ‘Darcy v Allin’ or ‘Darcy v Allein’. 
36 Section 1 of the Statute of Monopolies provides that the central objective of the statute is to 
encourage free trade and competition by rendering void all monopolies, including those 
granted under the authority of letters patent. Section 1 provides: ‘All monopolies and all 
commissions, grants, licenses, charters and letter patent theretofore made or granted or 
heretofore to be made or granted to any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate 
whatsoever, of or for the sole buying, selling, making or using of anything within this realm… 
are utterly void and of no effect.’  
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How the reference to section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies in modern 
Australian patent statutes is to be interpreted was explained by the High Court 
of Australia in NRDC.37 The Court held that the relevant question to be asked 
when determining whether an invention is patentable subject matter is:  
Is this a proper subject of letters patent according to the principles which 
have been developed for the application of s 6 of the Statute of 
Monopolies?’38  
What the Court meant is that the scope of patentable subject matter is to be 
determined by reference to what has been deemed to be patentable by the 
courts over time.  
The NRDC court embraced the view that ‘manner of manufacture’ is a broad, 
flexible and dynamic concept, the meaning of which has evolved, and will 
continue to evolve, over time.39 It said that the principles are to be applied 
flexibly, as technological advancement is ‘excitingly unpredictable’ and that it 
is not appropriate to attempt to reduce the patentable subject matter test to ‘an 
exact verbal formula’.40  
The purpose of s 6, it must be remembered, was to allow the use of the 
prerogative to encourage national development in a field which already, in 
1623, was seen to be excitingly unpredictable. To attempt to place upon the 
idea the fetters of an exact verbal formula could never have been sound. It 
would be unsound to the point of folly to attempt to do so now, when 
science has made such advances that the concrete applications of the notion 
which were familiar in 1623 can be seen to provide only the more obvious, 
not to say the more primitive, illustrations of the broad sweep of the 
concept.41 
Rather, the Court viewed the expression ‘manner of manufacture’ as being a 
general title to be interpreted in accordance with the purpose of the Statute of 
Monopolies and in line with common law principles established for the 
application of that purpose. 
                                                 
37 In NRDC, the Court considered the operation of the Statute of Monopolies in relation to the 
legislation then in force (Patents Act 1952 (Cth)). 
38 NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, 269. 
39 Ibid 270.  
40 Ibid 271 (cited and followed in Grant [2006] FCAFC 120, [7]–[8]). 
41 Ibid 271. 
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The inquiry which the definition demands is an inquiry into the scope of the 
permissible subject matter of letters patent and grants of privilege protected 
by the section. It is an inquiry not into the meaning of a word so much as 
into the breadth of the concept which the law has developed by its 
consideration of the text and purpose of the Statute of Monopolies. One may 
remark that although the Statute spoke of the inventor it nowhere spoke of 
the invention; all that is nowadays understood by the latter word as used in 
patent law it comprehended in ‘new manufactures’. The word ‘manufacture’ 
finds a place in the present Act, not as a word intended to reduce a question 
of patentability to a question of verbal interpretation, but simply as the 
general title found in the Statute of Monopolies for the whole category 
under which all grants of patents which may be made in accordance with 
the developed principles of patent law are to be subsumed.42 
The High Court held that, to be patentable, an invention must be an artificially 
created state of affairs of economic significance, meaning that its value to the 
country must be in the field of economic endeavour, and that it must have ‘an 
industrial or commercial or trading character’.43 Further, it said the invention 
must offer some advantage that is material in the sense that it must be part of 
the ‘useful arts’ rather than the ‘fine arts’.44 
The point is that a process … must be one that offers some advantage which 
is material, in the sense that the process belongs to a useful art as distinct 
from a fine art.45  
The Court identified several categories of excluded matter to aid in 
distinguishing between patentable and non-patentable subject matter. It made 
clear that patents protect new inventions and not discoveries, be they 
discoveries of the laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.46 In 
                                                 
42 Ibid 269. 
43 Ibid 275–7. 
44 On attempts to patent subject matter within the fine arts see: Ben McEniery, ‘“Storyline 
Patents”: Are Plots Patentable?’ (2009) 33(1) Melbourne University Law Review 291. 
45 National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 
252, 275 citing Re Virginia-Carolina Chemical Corporation's Application (1958) RPC 35, 36. 
46 Ibid 262–4. It is argued that in this respect, the Australian law is identical to the position in 
the United States. Examples of laws of nature include Sir Isaac Newton’s observations on the 
law of gravity and Albert Einstein’s general theory of relativity, while abstract ideas include 
novel and useful mathematical formulae: Diamond v Chakrabarty, 447 US 303, 309 (1980); 
Diamond v Diehr, 450 US 175, 185 (1981). A recent Australian example is Milton Edgar 
Anderson [2008] APO 19 (11 August 2008). There the Deputy Commissioner of Patents 
upheld the view that an alleged invention that relates to a mere scientific theory or discovery 
of the laws of nature, but is lacking a specific practical and useful application is not a ‘manner 
of manufacture’. The application in question relates to ‘the new science of subtronics’ and ‘a 
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regard to the distinction between unpatentable discoveries and patentable 
inventions the Court said that: 
There may indeed be a discovery without invention – either because the 
discovery is of some piece of abstract information without any suggestion 
of a practical application of it to a useful end, or because its application lies 
outside the realm of ‘manufacture’.47 
What the Court did not find was that non-physical inventions are a category of 
excluded matter. Rather, the Court left that question unresolved. 
But a question which appears still to await final decision is whether it is 
enough that a process produces a useful result or whether it is necessary that 
some physical thing is either brought into existence or so affected as the 
better to serve man’s purposes.48 
The author has argued previously that the NRDC court’s broad and expansive 
statement of principle precludes any suggestion that the patentable subject 
matter test might involve a physicality requirement49 and that, accordingly, 
the Federal Court’s finding in Grant is inconsistent with the High Court 
precedent it was bound to follow.50  
However, as the High Court in NRDC intended to consolidate rather than 
rewrite the existing law,51 a comprehensive exploration of relevant principle 
requires that regard be had not to NRDC alone. The High Court’s NRDC 
decision has been endorsed, followed and interpreted in a number of 
Australian cases. Those cases are examined below according to the subject 
matter categories in which they fall. 
                                                                                                                    
new law of electric induction’. The applicant indicated that the inventive concept is the 
‘revelation and utilisation of an antimatter voltage force that stems from the discovery of 
electrosubtronic fields and culminated in the new science of subtronics’. The Deputy 
Commissioner held that the invention claimed is a scientific theory or discovery of the laws of 
science without a specific practical and useful application and that, if a specific application 
were claimed, such an invention is not fully described. 
47 NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, 264. 
48 Ibid 270. 
49 McEniery, ‘Patents for Intangible Inventions in Australia After Grant v Commissioner of 
Patents (Part 1)’, above n 15. 
50 McEniery, ‘Patents for Intangible Inventions in Australia After Grant v Commissioner of 
Patents (Part 2)’, above n 15. See also McEniery, ‘The Patentability of Non-Physical 
Inventions: Lessons from the United States’, above n 2, 384–6. 
51 National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 
252, 269.  
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A Post-NRDC Cases Discussing ‘Manner of 
Manufacture’ 
 
1 Methods of Medical Treatment  
Although the legislation does not expressly exclude methods of medical 
treatment from patentability, before the decision in Joos v Commissioner of 
Patents in 1972 (‘Joos’)52 surgical or medical treatment of the human body, as 
well as non-medical procedures such as cosmetic treatments, were thought to 
be excluded from patentability.53  
Joos concerned a cosmetic process of treating human hair and nails. The issue 
considered by the High Court was whether this process is a patentable 
‘manner of manufacture’ for the purposes of the predecessor to the current 
legislation, the Patents Act 1952 (Cth). Barwick CJ, sitting alone, regarded the 
process as patentable, but distinguished it from medical treatment of disease, 
malfunction or incapacity, which he thought, without deciding the matter, 
might be ‘essentially non-economic’ in nature and therefore unsuitable for the 
grant of patent rights. In contrast his Honour regarded a cosmetic treatment of 
the human body as being of economic significance.54  
His Honour considered that the need, as described in NRDC, for an invention 
to be of economic or commercial significance, not to be that a process must 
have a commercial application.55 Instead, his Honour considered that the 
underlying notion was that the activity must fall within the useful arts, rather 
than the fine arts.56 
                                                 
52 (1972) 126 CLR 611 (Barwick CJ). 
53 Ibid 619–20. The source of the belief that surgical or medical treatment of the human body 
are not patentable appears to be Re C & W’s Application (1914) 31 RPC 235 (SG). See also 
The Upjohn Company (Robert's) Application [1977] RPC 94. 
54 Ibid 619–23. It would appear that his Honour was influenced by cases such as Re C & W’s 
Application (1914) 31 RPC 235 and Schering AG’s Application [1971] RPC 337 in this 
regard. 
55 Ibid 623–4 citing: National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents 
(1959) 102 CLR 252; Re an Application for a Patent by Henry Barnato Rantzen (Rantzen’s 
Application) (1946) 64 RPC 63, 66; Re Lenard’s Application (1954) 71 RPC 190, 192. 
56 Ibid 624 citing Re Virginia-Carolina Chemical Corporation’s Application (1958) RPC 35, 
36. 
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The conclusion he reached was that the activity of the hairdresser does not fit 
within the fine arts, but does fit comfortably within the useful arts.57 Given 
this explanation, it is hard to conceive that his Honour, if the question were 
put before him in an appropriate case, would find non-cosmetic medical 
treatment of disease, malfunction or incapacity essentially non-economic. His 
Honour said: 
In this case, the processes are to be used in what cannot be described 
otherwise than as a commercial activity of hairdressing, a sector of activity 
which accounts, I imagine, for a great deal of employment. I could not 
assign the skill of the hairdresser to the area of the fine arts and have little 
difficulty in placing it in the area of the useful arts. In my opinion, it is an 
activity in the field of economic endeavour and has commercial significance 
as those expressions ought to be understood in relation to the grant of 
patents.58 
In Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd,59 the Full Court of the Federal 
Court appeared to accept that a device and method for dealing with sleep 
apnoea was patentable subject matter, although the patent failed on other 
grounds. Following the first instance decision of Gummow J,60 Lockhart and 
Wilcox JJ by majority rejected the assertion that a method of treating the 
human body might be ‘generally inconvenient’. They held that it is for 
Parliament, not the courts, to determine whether otherwise patent eligible 
inventions should be denied protection on matters of ethics and social 
policy.61 Only Sheppard J found to the contrary, holding that granting a patent 
for a method of medical treatment would be ‘generally inconvenient’. His 
Honour’s rationale was that a court should not contemplate granting a patent 
over a surgical procedure to one medical practitioner if to do so might result 
in the death or unnecessary suffering of countless people.62 
The approach to the patentability of methods of medical treatment taken in 
Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd was affirmed by the Full Court of 
the Federal Court in Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v F H Faulding & Co 
Ltd.63 This case concerned the validity of two petty patents for methods of 
                                                 
57 Ibid 624. 
58 Ibid. 
59 (1994) 50 FCR 1 (Lockhart, Sheppard and Wilcox JJ). 
60 Rescare Ltd v Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd (1992) 25 IPR 119, 151. 
61 Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Limited v Rescare Limited (1994) 50 FCR 1, 16–19 (Lockhart J), 45 
(Wilcox J). 
62 Ibid 41. 
63 [2000] FCA 316 (Black CJ, Lehane and Finkelstein JJ). 
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administering taxol, a compound originally obtained from the bark of the 
Pacific yew tree, that has been found to inhibit the growth and division of 
certain cancer cells.64 The claimed methods prescribed the doses of taxol to be 
administered over certain timeframes.65 In cases such as this, it is important to 
distinguish between a patent for a drug and a patent for a method of 
administering a drug. Taxol is a naturally occurring compound and thus in 
itself unpatentable. At the priority date, taxol was a known substance and its 
great promise as an anti-cancer drug had been known for many years. What 
was not known were the optimal doses by which the drug should be 
administered in order to reduce toxicity within the body, which is the problem 
this invention was designed to overcome. In upholding the patentability of the 
method, Black CJ and Lehane J pointed out  
the insurmountable problem, from a public policy viewpoint, of drawing a 
logical distinction which would justify allowing patentability for a product 
for treating the human body, but deny patentability for a method of 
treatment.66 
While they mark some progression in the thinking regarding the application of 
patent law to methods of treating of the human body, none of the cases 
involving methods of medical treatment makes specific reference to the need 
to produce a physical effect or cause a physical transformation of matter. 
Although all methods of medical treatment involve biochemical 
transformations occurring within the human body, the courts make no 
mention of this and do not question whether physical changes of this nature 
are sufficient to invoke patentability. The courts’ focus has instead been on 
the economic or commercial significance of any artificially created state of 
affairs the methods employ. Given this focus, the cases demonstrate that it is 
commercial significance, not physicality, that is the essential prerequisite to 
patent eligibility.  
2 Computer Software  
The next step in the evolution of the patentable subject matter standard was 
the acceptance of computer software patents as patent eligible subject matter.  
Computer software and hardware are inextricably linked. General purpose 
computers are a generic platform upon which software runs. Once they are 
                                                 
64 Ibid [1]. 
65 Ibid [4]. 
66 Ibid [15]. 
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running software, general purpose computers behave like specific machines 
designed to perform the particular function the software is coded to perform. 
As most general purpose computers are inoperable in the absence of computer 
software, it is software rather than hardware, that dictates much of the 
functionality of computers.67 Likewise, software without a computer is 
useless.  
General purpose computers are a boon to innovation as they are the 
foundation upon which new innovative programs can be built. Software is a 
series of instructions that instruct a computer to perform a particular function. 
Software allows new information-processing advances to be devised by 
programmers who, with the help of an operating system, do not need to be 
concerned with, or even understand, the interaction between software code 
and the underlying computer hardware. Since general purpose computing 
machines already exist, programmers no longer need to ‘reinvent the wheel’, 
so to speak, by building their own machine. While software designed to run 
on a computer does need a machine to run, the machine itself forms part of the 
prior art and predates any inventive advance for which the programmer is 
responsible. The consequence is that most non-obvious computer software 
which is designed to run on a computer will not involve an inventive advance 
that has any significant physical element. This does not change the fact that a 
piece of software can be as useful and socially beneficial as any machine. 
It was initially thought that computer software was not amenable to patent 
protection because it fell within the prohibition on offering patents for 
schemes, plans for business, directions for performing a mental act and 
intellectual information.68 However, when this was put to the test, courts 
                                                 
67 Functionality can of course also be built into hardware. However, the beauty of building 
functionality at the software level is that software is much easier and less expensive to 
produce than specifically programmed hardware machines or components. 
68 James Lahore, ‘Computers and the Law: The Protection of Intellectual Property’ (1978) 9(1) 
Federal Law Review 15, 22–3. See also British Petroleum Co Ltd’s Application (British 
Petroleum) (1968) 38 AOJP 1020, 1021 (stating that methods of operating a general-purpose 
computer are inherently unpatentable because they are not a manner of new manufacture. It 
was also considered public policy that an owner of hardware should be able to use his or her 
machine freely ‘as he thinks fit’: ‘Computer programming is a relatively young art and, 
although many stratagems and simplifications have been devised so far, a much greater 
number may be expected to be devised in the future. It would certainly be mischievous to the 
State and generally inconvenient if, after investing a million dollars in a computer, the owner 
were to find himself prevented from operating it efficiently, or in any other manner he may 
wish, or with any degree of privacy or secrecy he may desire.’); Badger Company 
Incorporated’s Application (Badger) [1970] RPC 36, 40 (PAT) (finding a method of 
preparing, tabulating and codifying data to be inherently unpatentable because of the 
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overcame these difficulties by applying general principles of patent law and 
found computer software to be patentable subject matter. Australian law fell 
into step with the position in the United States.69 The courts focussed on the 
application of the program to produce a practical and useful result, rather than 
treating software as being nothing more than intellectual information.70 This 
approach debunked any suggestion that computer software was a special 
category of innovation that required special rules.  
In two pre-1977 United Kingdom cases it was held that computer programs 
are a proper subject matter for letters patent when embodied in some physical 
form. 
In Burroughs Corporation (Perkin’s) Application,71 the question before the 
Patents Appeal Tribunal was whether a claim to a method of transmitting 
information between a central master computer and a ring of outlying 
connected slave computers is a proper subject matter for letters patent. The 
tribunal held that, as the method involved some alteration in the operability of 
a physical object, the test set out in NRDC would be satisfied and the method 
would be patentable.72  
In relation to the requirement that there be a ‘vendible product’, Graham J 
said:  
it is not enough to take a narrow and confined look at the ‘product’ 
produced by a method. Of course, if a method is regarded purely as the 
conception of an idea, it can always be said that the product of such a 
method is merely intellectual information. If, however, in practice the 
method results in a new machine or process or an old machine giving a new 
and improved result, that fact should in our view be regarded as the 
                                                                                                                    
conceptual nature of the raw material, and its failure to contribute to the fashioning of a 
product). 
69 The United States position is described in Diamond v Diehr, 450 US 175 (1981). 
70 CCOM v Jiejing (1994) 122 ALR 417 [128]; Grant [2006] FCAFC 120, [29]; Welcome Real-
Time SA v Catuity Inc [2001] FCA 445 [122], [128]. Unlike in other jurisdictions, such as in 
Europe, there is no legislative provision in Australia expressly limiting the patentability of 
computer software. The Patents Act 1990 (Cth) does not define or refer specifically to 
software. 
71 [1974] RPC 147 (PAT) (Graham and Whitford JJ). Graham J gave an opinion on behalf of 
the Tribunal. 
72 Ibid 158. 
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‘product’ or the result of using the method, and cannot be disregarded in 
considering whether the method is patentable or not.73 
Graham J expressed the view that computer software can be patented and will 
not be regarded merely as intellectual information to the extent that its claims 
are directed to an embodiment in some apparatus or process of manufacture. 
If the bare method or idea is also clothed by the patentee in his specification 
with a practical garment in the shape of apparatus enabling that method or 
idea to be realised in practice, it should no longer be regarded as a naked 
conception, for it has found a practical embodiment in the apparatus. It is 
then a manner of new manufacture.74 
His Honour distinguished Rolls-Royce Limited’s Application, which involved 
no modification of the aircraft itself in order to make it operate more quietly.  
In the present case the method necessarily involves a modification. The 
system is programmed so that it must in every case operate in accordance 
with the method claimed whenever and by whomsoever it is put into 
operation. The programme in fact constrains the apparatus to function in a 
particular way as long as the apparatus embodies that programme. In the 
Rolls-Royce case on the other hand it can be said that the method was no 
more than information or instructions which could be given to a pilot on 
which he might, or might not, act.75 
Graham J then went on to draw a connection between computer software and 
a physical effect when he said, ‘computer programs which have the effect of 
controlling computers to operate in a particular way, where such programs are 
embodied in physical form, are proper subject matter for letters patent.’76  
His Honour considered the mere fact that the computer software would need 
to be recorded on some physical storage medium, such as magnetic tape (as 
would have been the readily available technology at the time), or that the 
software would run on a physical device such as a computer, to be the 
indicative factors. It was these physical aspects that his Honour relied upon to 
classify the software as being inherently patentable rather than purely 
                                                 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid 160. 
76 Ibid 161. 
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intellectual information.77 However, while this statement indicates that his 
Honour considered these physical aspects to be indicative of patent eligibility, 
it does not necessarily indicate that they are a prerequisite to patent eligibility. 
This decision was followed four years later by Graham and Whitford JJ in 
International Business Machines Corporation’s Application (IBM’s 
Application),78 the last case relating to computer programs decided in the 
United Kingdom before the commencement of the 1977 Act. The case 
involved the automation of a known method of processing financial data in a 
computer software program. It was held that the method of operating or 
controlling a conventional computer to process financial data was inherently 
patentable, as was the computer program by which the method was effected. 
The software program involved was designed to automatically calculate the 
selling price of stocks or shares by comparing a list of buy and sell orders. 
Despite accepting that the scheme was not itself novel and that a completely 
standard computer could be programmed to perform it, Graham and Whitford 
JJ upheld the patent. The argument that a known computer programmed in a 
new way differed in intellectual content only, and was thus inherently lacking 
novelty, was expressly rejected. The court held that ‘[t]here must be different 
holes in the card [embodying the program] or different magnetic patterns on 
the tape, or some other automatic control imposed to ensure that the computer 
carries out the particular operation required’.79 Thus, it was differences in the 
physical manifestation of data as recorded on physical media that precluded  
the program and programmed computer from being mere mechanical 
equivalents to previous programs and computers respectively.80  
The decisions in these cases have found favour in Australia. Burroughs 
Corporation (Perkin’s) Application was later cited with approval in 1991 by 
Burchett J in the Federal Court decision of International Business Machines 
                                                 
77 Graham J agreed with the contention of Mr Rogers of counsel that Slee & Harris’s 
Application [1966] RPC 194 was wrongly decided. The claim in Slee & Harris was for a 
‘method of operating a computer’ that involved an improved technique of ‘linear 
programming’ which was refused on the basis that the only ‘product’ of the method was 
intellectual information which was not a ‘vendible product’: ibid 196–7. 
78 [1980] FSR 564 (PAT) (Graham and Whitford JJ). 
79 Ibid 569. 
80 Justine Pila, ‘Inherent Patentability in Anglo-Australian Law: A History’ (2003) 14 
Australian Intellectual Property Journal 109, 159. See also Slee and Harris’s Application 
[1966] RPC 194; Gever’s Application [1970] RPC 91; and Badger Co Inc’s Application 
[1970] RPC 36. 
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Corporation v Commissioner of Patents,81 and both decisions were cited with 
approval by the Full Court of the Federal Court in 1994 in CCOM v Jiejing.82  
In one of the earlier Australian cases involving computer software, 
International Business Machines Corporation v Commissioner of Patents, 
Burchett J held that software inventions are potentially patentable subject 
matter, given the expansive approach taken in NRDC. The invention in 
question concerned an improved ‘method and apparatus for generating curves 
on computer graphics displays’.83 It was objected to on the grounds that it 
recites, and wholly pre-empts, a mathematical algorithm. The word, 
‘algorithm’ was defined by the court to mean, ‘a procedure for solving a given 
type of mathematical problem’.84  
Burchett J drew the same distinction between a mere algorithm and a useful 
commercial application of the algorithm as had been drawn in the United 
States, and held that the software in dispute was the latter.85 His Honour held 
that, while the mathematics of the invention were not new, the application to 
computers to produce an improved curve was a new and commercially useful 
result in the field of computer graphics, and the invention was patentable.86 
Just as those compounds were previously known, so here, it is not suggested 
there is anything new about the mathematics of the invention. What is new 
is the application of the selected mathematical methods to computers, and in 
particular, to the production of the desired curve by computer. This is said 
to involve steps which are foreign to the normal use of computers and, for 
that reason, to be inventive. The production of an improved curve image is a 
commercially useful effect in computer graphics.87 
With regard to physical effect or transformation, Burchett J only held that the 
method of producing an improved curved image on a computer would be 
                                                 
81 (1991) 22 IPR 417. This case is sometimes also cited as International Business Machines 
Corporation v Smith, Commissioner of Patents. 
82 (1994) 122 ALR 417. 
83 International Business Machines Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1992) 22 IPR 417, 
418. 
84 Ibid 419.  
85 Ibid 419–20 citing with approval Gottschalk v Benson, 409 US 63, 67 (1972) and Parker v 
Flook, 198 USPQ 193, 199 (1978). Burchett J did not expressly endorse, reject or apply the 
United States Federal Circuit’s Freeman-Walter-Abele formula. However, he noted that he 
did not believe that the United States case law was inconsistent with his view. 
86 Ibid 424–5. 
87 Ibid 424. 
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patentable because it creates a ‘commercially useful effect’.88 He did not say 
that the invention in question was patentable because it involved a physical 
aspect, such as a computer or a storage device, although he may have thought 
it unnecessary to do so given that he cited Burroughs Corporation (Perkin’s) 
Application favourably. On the other hand, it could be that his Honour chose 
to disregard this aspect of those decisions without drawing attention to the fact 
he had done so. It would appear unlikely that Burchett J would have been in 
favour of a physicality requirement, as his Honour preferred the view that it is 
by ‘the production of some useful effect that patent law has distinguished ... 
between the discovery of a principle of science and the making of an 
invention’.89 Consequently, it can be assumed that where a commercially 
useful effect can be discerned from the terms of the claim, the claim concerns 
an invention as opposed to a principle of science or law of nature, and is 
therefore inherently patentable subject matter, regardless of any physical basis 
to the claim.90 
The Full Court of the Federal Court in CCOM v Jiejing91 affirmed Burchett 
J’s decision in International Business Machines Corporation v Commissioner 
of Patents. In CCOM v Jiejing, the Full Court considered the patentability of a 
Chinese language word processor. The invention was a computer software 
apparatus used to assemble and record text in Chinese characters. It consisted 
of software running on a conventional computer with a standard keyboard and 
monitor specially adapted to facilitate input of Chinese characters from a 
database.92 
In a unanimous decision, the Full Court found the invention to be patentable 
subject matter. In doing so, the Court explained that the patentable subject 
matter formulation in NRDC could be applied to computer software 
inventions.  
The NRDC Case (102 CLR at 275-277) requires a mode or manner of 
achieving an end result which is an artificially created state of affairs of 
utility in the field of economic endeavour. In the present case, a relevant 
field of economic endeavour is the use of word processing to assemble text 
in Chinese language characters.  The end result achieved is the retrieval of 
                                                 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid 423. 
90 Andrew Christie and Serena Syme, ‘Patents for Algorithms in Australia’ (1998) 20(4) Sydney 
Law Review 517. 
91 (1994) 122 ALR 417 (Spender, Gummow and Heerey JJ). 
92 Australian Petty Patent No 616, 154 (‘Symbol Definition Apparatus’). 
2011 PHYSICALITY IN AUSTRALIAN PATENT LAW 23 
graphic representations of desired characters, for assembly of text. The 
mode or manner of obtaining this, which provides particular utility in 
achieving the end result, is the storage of data as to Chinese characters 
analysed by stroke-type categories, for search including ‘flagging’ (and 
‘unflagging’) and selection by reference thereto.93 
The court addressed the relationship between patentable inventions and 
physical form when discussing the concept of manufacture. In relation to the 
invention in NRDC, the Full Court said that the ‘central question in the case’ 
was: 
whether a process for killing weeds could be within the relevant concept of 
invention in s 6 because it produced a useful physical result in relation to a 
material or tangible entity.94 
Read alone, this statement does not make clear whether the Full Court was 
reading a physicality requirement into the NRDC test, or whether it considered 
the presence of a physical aspect only to be an indication or ‘clue’ that a 
method involving the use of an algorithm is patentable, as opposed to being a 
mere abstract idea. At no point in the judgment does the court specifically 
state that producing a physical effect or causing a physical transformation of 
matter is a required element of patent eligibility.95 
It is, however, made clear by the cases involving computer software 
inventions cited by the Full Court in the course of its reasons that it is the 
second of these that is supported.96 That is, the court regarded physicality as 
merely a clue that indicates patentability. The court noted that in the last case 
relating to computer programs decided in the United Kingdom before the 
commencement of the 1977 Act, International Business Machines 
Corporation’s Application,97 Graham and Whitford JJ, sitting as the Patents 
Appeal Tribunal, held that a claim to software designed to automatically 
calculate the selling price of stock or shares in an auction market involved 
                                                 
93 CCOM v Jiejing (1994) 122 ALR 417, 450. 
94 Ibid 446 citing National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents 
(1959) 102 CLR 252, 268. 
95 In particular see the court’s application of the law to the facts: CCOM v Jiejing (1994) 122 
ALR 417, 450. 
96 Burroughs Corporation (Perkin's) Application [1974] RPC 147; CCOM v Jiejing (1994) 122 
ALR 417, 446, 448–449; International Business Machines Corporation’s Application (1980) 
FSR 564; International Business Machines Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1991) 33 
FCR 218.  
97 [1980] FSR 564. 
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more than just ‘intellectual information’ because the method was involved in 
the program and in the apparatus in physical form.98 There was nothing in that 
case that indicated that the judges saw this physical form as a prerequisite to 
patentability. 
The court also noted the earlier Federal Court decision of International 
Business Machines Corp v Commissioner of Patents,99 in which Burchett J 
followed the decision of the Patents Appeal Tribunal in Burroughs 
Corporation (Perkin’s) Application, where the same two judges, Graham and 
Whitford JJ, expressed the view that computer programs embodied in physical 
form are proper subject matter for letters patent.100 The judges expressed the 
view that a computer software invention can be patented, and will not be 
regarded as merely intellectual information, to the extent that it claims an 
embodiment in some apparatus or process of manufacture.101  
CCOM v Jiejing firmly established in Australia that computer software is 
something more than an unpatentable mathematical algorithm or a mere 
abstract idea. Following CCOM v Jiejing, it would seem that the mere 
presence of a physical device associated with a computer program will be 
enough to ensure it will not be rejected for being an unpatentable 
mathematical algorithm or a mere abstract idea, provided that the combination 
of the device and software satisfies the NRDC requirement that a method be a 
manner of achieving an artificially created state of affairs that is of practical 
utility in the field of economic endeavour.102 However, there is nothing in the 
decision to suggest that physicality is a perquisite to patentability. Given that 
the technology is such that most computer software runs on general purpose 
computers, it seems at first glance that a lack of physical effect is not likely to 
be a successful argument against patenting computer software. While the 
High Court has not directly addressed the patent eligibility of computer 
software, it made comments by way of obiter in Data Access Corporation v 
Powerflex Services Pty Ltd,103 which indicate that it approved of the approach 
                                                 
98 CCOM v Jiejing (1994) 122 ALR 417, 448 citing International Business Machines 
Corporation’s Application (IBM’s Application) [1980] FSR 564, 572. 
99 (1991) 33 FCR 218; 105 ALR 388. 
100 CCOM v Jiejing (1994) 122 ALR 417, 448–9 citing Burroughs Corp (Perkin’s) Application 
[1974] RPC 147, 161. 
101 Burroughs Corporation (Perkin’s) Application [1974] RPC 147, 158. 
102 Anne Fitzgerald and Scott Phillips, ‘Patentability of Software in Australia: CCOM v Jiejing’ 
(1994) 5(2) Journal of Law, Information and Science 296, 304–5. 
103 (1999) 202 CLR 1 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
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taken by the court in CCOM v Jiejing. There the Court, citing CCOM v Jiejing 
in a footnote, said:  
In Australia claims to computer programs which are novel, not obvious and 
otherwise satisfy the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) and which have the effect of 
controlling computers to operate in a particular way, have been held to be 
proper subject matter for letters patent, as “achieving an end result which is 
an artificially created state of affairs of utility in the field of economic 
endeavour”, within the meaning of National Research Development 
Corporation v Commissioner of Patents. [NOTE: The footnote to add is: 
Ibid 15 citing CCOM Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd (1994) 51 FCR 260, 295.] 
The view that software is patentable simply because it affects the operation of 
an apparatus in a physical form was adopted (by way of obiter) by the Full 
Federal Court in Grant. The Court in Grant regarded the physicality 
requirement as having been met in respect of claims to computer software 
where the software affects the operation of an apparatus in a physical form 
(which would include a computer). The court took the view that a change in 
state or information in a machine, or part of a machine, is a physical effect of 
the requisite kind. The Court said: 
In Catuity and CCOM as in State Street and AT&T, there was a component 
that was physically affected or a change in state or information in a part of a 
machine. These can all be regarded as physical effects.104  
With respect, the views of Burchett J in International Business Machines 
Corp v Commissioner of Patents, Graham and Whitford JJ in Burroughs 
Corporation (Perkin’s) Application and International Business Machines 
Corporation’s Application and the Full Federal Court in Grant are 
problematic. The view taken by these judges is that computer software is 
certainly patent eligible because the general purpose computers it runs, and 
the media the programs are recorded on, are physical objects.105 This ignores 
the fact that computers and data storage devices are not a part of the inventive 
concept of software, but are the base or foundation upon which the inventive 
concept is built.  
The problem with this logic is that the physical aspect is not embedded in the 
algorithm as such, but rather exists in the computer upon which the software 
                                                 
104 Grant [2006] FCAFC 120, [32]. 
105 It should be noted that Burchett, Graham and Whitford JJ in these instances appear not to 
take the view that the physical relationship between particular software and any computer 
upon which it runs is a basis for finding that patentable subject matter exists.  
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runs. The approach fails to consider the argument that software is an 
intangible product. It is true that software requires a physical device such as a 
general purpose computer to run or a storage medium upon which it is 
recorded. However, to think that software running on a general purpose 
computer might be unpatentable because it does not involve a physical effect 
or transformation is to confuse an incidental physical medium with the 
inventive breakthrough.106 The fallacy inherent in this argument becomes 
obvious when the principle of hardware/software equivalence is considered. 
That principle is that anything implemented in software can be replicated in 
hardware to achieve the same result. The benefit of building functionality into 
software is that software is easier and less expensive to produce than a 
specifically programmed machine. Since a machine programmed to perform a 
specific task is undoubtedly patentable subject matter, there is no reason why 
functionally equivalent software should be treated differently.107 For these 
reasons, patent drafting that seeks to show a physical interaction between 
software and an underlying computer promotes form over substance.108 
According to Durham: 
Such things should be considered to be at the core of patentable subject 
matter, without straining to rely on the tangible aspects of the computer 
hardware. The silicon and wire of the computer circuits, the electrons that 
course through those circuits, the mouse and keyboard that provide input, 
and the monitor or paper that displays the results are all physical entities.109 
Further, the physical hardware platform forms part of the prior art and is 
therefore not in substance part of any software invention.  
                                                 
106 Ben McEniery, ‘Physicality in the Information Age: A Normative Perspective on the Patent 
Eligibility of Non-Physical Methods’ (2011) 10 Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual 
Property 106, 191–2. 
107 Dennis S Karjala, ‘Distinguishing Patent and Copyright Subject Matter’ (2003) 35 
Connecticut Law Review 439, 444–5; Brian Fitzgerald et al, Internet and E-commerce Law: 
Technology, Law and Policy (Thomson Reuters, 2007) 299. 
108 That being said, it may still be prudent for patent attorneys to draft patent applications 
claiming computer software in a way that makes specific reference to physical objects, such 
as input devices for receiving data, interactions with the computer’s memory for storing data, 
interactions with the computer’s processor, and an output mechanism for displaying data to a 
human (or another machine), for the reason that the courts and patent offices are still 
susceptible to granting patents where a physical element is disclosed, even though the 
hardware often has little or no connection to the inventive breakthrough. Cohen and Lemley 
call this ‘the doctrine of the magic words’: Julie E Cohen and Mark A Lemley, ‘Patent Scope 
and Innovation in the Software Industry’ (2001) 89 California Law Review 1, 9. 
109 Alan Durham, ‘Useful Arts in the Information Age’ (1999) Brigham Young University Law 
Review 1419, 1514. 
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For this reason, any finding that Australian law contains a physicality 
requirement would necessitate a reconsideration of whether computer 
software is patentable, or an explanation of how software running on a general 
purpose computer could possibly satisfy the physicality requirement. This is 
the case since computer software, running on a known general purpose 
computer, does not ordinarily produce or physically transform a tangible 
article, but merely manipulates or outputs data. Rather, the recognition that 
computer software is patentable demonstrates that a physicality requirement is 
not an essential part of the patentable subject matter test. The better view, 
therefore, is that taken by Federal Court in CCOM v Jiejing, which involves 
an investigation as to whether the manner of obtaining the end result achieved 
is a manner of manufacture, irrespective of whether invoking the claimed 
method results in a transformation of physical matter.  
3 Business Methods 
While it is now clear that business methods, as a class, are not automatically 
excluded from patentability,110 following Grant, it can only really be said with 
certainty that a business method will fall safely within the scope of patentable 
subject matter if it operates sufficiently upon, or in relation to, some tangible 
physical item or device.111  
For a time, the prevailing assumption in Australia had been that business 
methods were excluded from patentability as a class of invention.112 In 
                                                 
110 The business method exception to patentability was rejected in the United States in State 
Street Bank & Trust Co. v Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F 3d 1368, 1375 (Fed Cir 
1998) (‘We take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception to rest.’) aff’d in AT&T 
Corp v Excel Communications, Inc, 172 F 3d 1352 (Fed Cir 1999) and In re Bilski, 545 F 3d 
943, 960 (Fed Cir 2008) (en banc). The State Street rejection of the business method 
exception was followed by the Federal Court of Australia in Welcome Real-Time SA v Catuity 
Inc [2001] FCA 445 [125]-[126] (Heerey J) and Grant [2006] FCAFC 120 [26]. The 
patentability of business methods should not have been perceived to be as much of a mystery 
as one might have thought, given that the modern decisions refuting the business method 
exception were pre-empted by Re Cooper’s Application (1901) 19 RPC 53, 54, and by Re 
Fishburn’s Application (1938) 57 RPC 245, 248, where Morton J said that while a mere 
scheme or plan is not the proper subject of a patent, an alleged invention which serves a 
mechanical purpose that has useful results does not become an unpatentable scheme or plan 
merely because the purpose is in the carrying on of a branch of business. 
111 Grant [2006] FCAFC 120. 
112 James Lahore, ‘Computers and the Law: The Protection of Intellectual Property’ (1978) 9(1) 
Federal Law Review 15, 22–3 (‘Some matter has never been considered to constitute a 
patentable invention. This matter includes a method of calculation or a process of 
mathematical operations [including ways of solving mathematical problems], business, 
commercial and financial schemes, schemes of operation, and printed sheets, cards, tickets or 
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Quigley Co Inc’s Application,113 the Assistant Commissioner of Patents was 
asked to consider the patentability of a method of increasing steel production 
by operating two or more furnaces in accordance with a roster to make more 
effective use of workers. Neither the steel making process itself, nor the 
operation of a furnace throughout a steel producing period, was new. The steel 
produced was not improved or modified in any way. 
The Assistant Commissioner rejected the submission that this method 
satisfied the expansive criteria laid down in NRDC and thus constituted 
patentable subject matter.  
I find nothing in those decisions which suggest that such a commonplace 
management technique as scheduling for the better utilisation of manpower 
is proper subject matter of a patent. [The applicant] argued that, as more 
steel is produced in a given period, the method is of economic importance. 
However, the greater steel output is not due to any change in the method of 
producing steel or in the way a furnace is operated. It results from the fact 
that, by operating his directions, the crew is employed more effectively and 
performs more work in that period.114 
The Assistant Commissioner took the view that nothing in the NRDC case 
suggests that a management technique for the better utilisation of manpower 
is a proper subject matter for a patent, despite the fact that the crew was more 
effectively employed and use of the method resulted in greater steel output.  
He has merely devised a roster or schedule for his work force so as to obtain 
more work from a normal crew in a given period. He realised that all of the 
men in a normal crew were not fully employed throughout the duration of a 
steel producing period. He decided to take up some of the slack by partly 
overlapping the steel producing periods of two furnaces during that part of 
the campaign when both are operating at less than the maximum number of 
steel producing heats per day. It is true that this more effective direction of 
his work force enables him to obtain more steel producing heats, and 
thereby produce more steel, in a given period. But that does not alter the 
fact that all he has done is to devise a roster or schedule to direct the 
activities of his men in carrying out the various known procedures in the 
known process of making steel.115 
                                                                                                                    
the like which are mere records of intelligence.’); Ricketson, ‘Business Method Patents: A 
Matter of Convenience?’, above n 37, 109–11. 
113 [1977] FSR 373. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid. 
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According to Ricketson, similar results are to be observed in a number of 
other pre-NRDC Australian cases.116 However, it is difficult to see how such a 
view is consistent with the principles laid down in NRDC, given that the 
method that was sought to be protected is a process involving the practical 
operation of an inventive concept to produce an improved result and that is of 
utility and economic significance. 
The notion that Australian law might contain a business method exception 
was rejected in Australia in Welcome Real-Time SA v Catuity Inc. (‘Welcome 
Real-Time v Catuity’).117 The invention considered in Welcome Real-Time v 
Catuity is a method and device for the operation of smart cards in connection 
with traders’ loyalty programs. The smart cards in question contain 
microprocessors or chips able to receive and store information. The problem 
to be overcome was that the smart cards have only ‘a small memory capacity’, 
which, when using conventional ‘static’ methods to store information, can 
only store loyalty points information in relation to a limited number of traders, 
being fewer than the number of traders who use loyalty programs. The 
invention overcame this problem by using a dynamic memory allocation 
technique so the cards could be used across thousands of merchants, each 
operating their own proprietary loyalty programs. One of the advantages of 
the dynamic memory allocation technique used was that a portion of memory 
on a card was only allocated to a trader once a consumer carrying the card 
actually used that trader’s services.118 
Heerey J, sitting as a single judge in the Federal Court, upheld the 
patentability of this invention after applying the manner of manufacture test 
set out in NRDC. In doing so, his Honour distinguished between an 
unpatentable abstract idea and an idea reduced to a specific practical 
application in a manner consistent with the approach taken in CCOM v 
Jiejing. 
                                                 
116 Ricketson, ‘Business Method Patents: A Matter of Convenience?’, above n 37, 109–10 
citing the following: Re Brown (1899) 5 ALR 81 (Supreme Court of Victoria) (an improved 
method of preventing the fraudulent re-use of sales book dockets); Commissioner of Patents v 
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117 [2001] FCA 445 (Heerey J). 
118 Ibid [18]. 
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In my opinion the Patent does produce an artificial state of affairs in that 
cards can be issued making available to consumers many different loyalty 
programs of different traders as well as different programs offered by the 
same trader. All this can be done instantaneously at each retail outlet. So 
what is involved here is not just an abstract idea or method of calculation. 
Moreover this result is beneficial in a field of economic endeavour - namely 
retail trading - because it enables many traders (including small traders) to 
use loyalty programs and thereby compete more effectively for business.119 
In doing so, he recognised that the invention before the court involved both a 
method and a device, and as such was not a pure, or non-physical, business 
method. 
What is disclosed by the Patent is not a business method, in the sense of a 
particular method or scheme for carrying on a business ... Rather, the Patent 
is for a method and a device, involving components such as smart cards and 
POS terminals, in a business; and not just one business but an infinite range 
of retail businesses.120  
In assessing the patent eligibility of this invention, Heerey J made clear that, 
as in the United States, there is no business method exception to patentability 
in Australia. His Honour found the US Federal Circuit’s State Street Bank & 
Trust Co v Signature Financial Group (‘State Street’)121 decision persuasive, 
despite the United States test for patentable subject matter being different to 
that in Australia, and the United States patent law having a different historical 
source owing little or nothing to the Statute of Monopolies.122 The reasons his 
Honour gave to support this finding were that: 
the social needs the law has to serve in that country are the same as in ours. 
In both countries, in similar commercial and technological environments, 
                                                 
119 Ibid [127]. 
120 Ibid [128] (original emphasis). 
121 State Street Bank & Trust Co. v Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed Cir 
1998), cert denied 525 US 1093 (1999). According to the Federal Circuit in State Street, an 
invention will be patentable subject matter if it ‘produces a useful, concrete and tangible 
result’, a test the meaning of which the court never explained. The test has since been 
abandoned, having been described by the Federal Circuit as being ‘insufficient to determine 
whether a claim is patent-eligible’: In re Bilski, 545 F 3d 943, 959 (Fed Cir 2008). The 
Federal Circuit’s view was endorsed by the Supreme Court on appeal: Bilski v Kappos, 561 
US ___ (2010). For a critique of the Federal Circuit’s now overruled decision in In re Bilski, 
545 F 3d 943, 959 (Fed Cir 2008), see Benjamin J McEniery, ‘The Federal Circuit in Bilski: 
The Machine-or-Transformation Test’ (2009) 91(4) Journal of the Patent and Trademark 
Office Society 254. 
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the law has to strike a balance between, on the one hand, the encouragement 
of true innovation by the grant of monopoly and, on the other, freedom of 
competition.123 
In relation to the physicality issue, Heerey J noted that the High Court in 
NRDC had not determined the issue of whether an invention requires a 
physical effect or transformation of matter to be patentable.124 Therefore, his 
Honour did not regard the law as requiring a physically observable effect. He 
also noted that he did not need to decide the issue in any event, since the 
invention before him did involve a physically observable effect. 
The respondents’ argument for distinguishing CCOM — the supposed lack 
of ‘physically observable effect’ — turns on an expression not found in 
CCOM itself. Nor does such a concept form part of the Full Court’s 
reasoning. In any event, to the extent that ‘physically observable effect’ is 
required (and I do not accept that this is necessarily so) it is to be found in 
the writing of new information to the Behaviour file and the printing of the 
coupon.125 
The invention claimed in Welcome Real-Time v Catuity does not involve the 
creation of a machine or other physical device. Instead, it is a means of 
recording data on an existing physical device. It arguably involves a 
transformation of matter. After a smart card is used in accordance with the 
claimed method, the state of the magnetic strip that houses the data is altered 
to the extent that electrons that comprise the strip are re-arranged to record the 
data stored on the card. This is not an incidental physical transformation. It is 
integral to the dynamic data storage method claimed. 
In Welcome Real-Time v Catuity and CCOM v Jiejing the patentable 
inventions were commercially useful methods of manipulating data and 
information. In both cases, the reduction of the methods to electronic devices 
had replaced what had previously been a laborious exercise in manual and 
mental administration: collecting a prescribed number of stamps that were 
then sent to a central location and a gift sent in return in Welcome Real-Time v 
Catuity; and translation from one language into another in CCOM v Jiejing. It 
is this automation that gives the inventions practical utility and economic 
significance. This suggests that automated methods are patentable subject 
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matter, provided they are sufficiently described and capable of exact, or 
substantially identical, repetition. 
V CONCLUSION 
The argument made in this article is that the post-NRDC, pre-Grant cases do 
not support a physicality requirement. Instead, they support a broad, flexible 
and technology-neutral approach to the patentable subject matter inquiry 
devoid of physical constraints. This article disputes the validity of the 
assertion made in the Federal Court’s decision in Grant that the physicality 
requirement established is consistent with the existing case law. The cases 
examined show that it is economic and commercial significance, rather than 
physical embodiment, that is the focus of the patentable subject matter 
inquiry. Accordingly, the argument made is that, by finding in favour of a 
physicality requirement, the Federal Court’s decision in Grant is not 
consistent with NRDC or the post-NRDC case law that preceded it. 
The cases examined show that there is a dearth of cases, with the exception of 
cases involving claims to computer software, in which the patent eligibility of 
non-physical methods is considered. For this reason, the law surrounding the 
patent eligibility of non-physical methods is largely to be determined by 
reference to the law that governs patents for inventions that do involve a 
physical effect or transformation of matter. Why there is no body of Anglo-
Australian case law dealing with non-physical inventions or a demonstrable 
history of patents being granted in respect of them is a matter of conjecture. It 
is clearly not the case that the invention of new and useful non-physical 
methods is a recent phenomenon. New and inventive financial transactions, 
tax minimisation strategies, asset protection schemes, methods of organising a 
workforce, methods of teaching or training people and animals, compliance 
procedures and risk-hedging strategies have been used for centuries. So, why 
is it that their patent eligibility has only recently come to the fore? 
It would appear that people either largely presumed that non-physical 
inventions are not patent eligible, or had not thought to patent innovation of 
this kind. Such an outcome would be unsurprising given that these are things 
that fall outside the traditional expectations as to what subject matter the 
patent system is designed to protect. It may be that our understanding of 
technology, or our understanding of the purpose and scope of the patent 
system, has prevented people from seeking patents over non-physical 
inventions. It cannot merely be assumed that, since there has not been a 
consistent practice of patents for non-physical inventions being sought or 
granted, these things are not patentable.  
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Despite there being cases in which the patent eligibility of methods of medical 
treatment involving biochemical transformations occurring within the human 
body has been considered, in none of these cases has a physicality 
requirement been expressly considered or invoked.126 The courts’ focus has 
instead been on the economic or commercial significance of any artificially 
created state of affairs the methods produce. Given this focus, the cases 
demonstrate that it is commercial significance, not physicality or moral 
acceptability, that is the essential prerequisite to patent eligibility.  
Likewise, the computer software cases do not support a physicality 
requirement.127 Instead, these cases suggest that physicality is only a ‘clue’ to 
patentability, not a prerequisite. The focus of those cases has largely been on 
the practical outcomes that software programs achieve. On a very broad view, 
it could be said that computer software as we know it today always involves a 
physical effect because software needs to be recorded on some sort of 
physical medium and run on a computer (which is a physical device that 
experiences a change in state as a consequence). This is the view taken in 
Grant. The better view is that software is an intangible set of instructions that 
produces a useful informational result and that any physical change that takes 
place within a computer running the software is incidental and irrelevant to 
patentability. Taking this view would lead to the conclusion that a physicality 
requirement would invalidate most computer software patents. Such a view 
would be clearly inconsistent with the existing Anglo-Australian case law 
confirming the patentability of software. As such, the courts’ recognition that 
software is patentable subject matter is inconsistent with the existence of a 
physicality requirement. 
Following the software cases is the decision of a single judge of the Federal 
Court, Heerey J, in Welcome Real-Time v Catuity. Heerey J repeated the fact 
that the High Court in NRDC had not determined the issue of whether an 
invention must produce a physical effect or cause a physical transformation of 
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matter and expressed doubt that such a requirement exists. He expressed the 
view that he himself did not believe that such a requirement exists at law.128  
The eminent judges in NRDC were very much concerned that the manner of 
manufacture inquiry be construed so as to allow the patent system to reward, 
and thereby encourage, all new and exciting technological advances. It is 
argued that this rationale was not the underlying basis of the Federal Court’s 
decision in Grant, which instead sought to find in NRDC and the associated 
case law a principle to justify curbing the expansion of the scope of patentable 
subject matter. 
The NRDC approach to the patentable subject matter test requires that an 
artificially created state of affairs that is of economic or commercial 
significance be created. Thus, to be patent eligible, it is sufficient that an 
invention involves a specific practical application of an idea or principle to 
achieve a useful result, and there is no requirement that an invention must 
produce a physical effect or cause a physical transformation of matter. Rather, 
a physical effect or transformation is merely an indication, or ‘clue’, that the 
subject matter is patent eligible, not a prerequisite.129 Accordingly, it is not 
only traditionally recognised mechanical, industrial, chemical and 
manufacturing processes that are patent eligible, as patent eligibility extends 
to include non-physical inventions. The consequence is that the rewards of the 
patent system will continue to encourage new and innovative technologies, 
even those knowledge- and information-based inventions that will be the 
hallmark of the knowledge economy of the Information Age.  
It is foreseeable that much of the groundbreaking innovation we are likely to 
witness in the ‘knowledge economy’ will involve the use and manipulation of 
information and data rather than the use and manipulation of physical 
matter.130 Given that the importance of enhancing productivity and 
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profitability through the use of new and innovative methods of processing 
data and information has come to the fore in recent times, it is of little surprise 
that people would seek patents for non-physical methods. Whether Australian 
patent law will keep pace with this reality is as yet unknown. That people 
would assume the reach of patent law is limited to new machines, devices and 
physically-transformative methods is unsurprising given that innovation in 
bygone eras has been marked by technological advances of this kind. 
However, this is merely a reflection of the kinds of advances that have 
previously dominated the technological landscape and hitherto held views 
about the nature of technology and patent eligibility. It does not necessarily 
reflect the state of the law or the nature of technology.  
